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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this Working Paper is to provide an empirical analysis of the marginal return on 
working capital and fixed capital in agriculture, based on data gathered by the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network from seven EU member states. Particular emphasis is placed on 
the detection of credit market imperfections. The key idea is to provide farm group-specific 
estimates of the shadow price of capital, and to use these to analyse the drivers of on-farm 
capital use in European agriculture. Based on Cobb Douglas estimates of farm-type specific 
production functions, we find that working capital is typically used in more than 
economically optimal quantities and often displays negative marginal returns across 
countries and farm types. This is less often the case with regard to fixed capital, but it is only 
in a small set of sectors where access to fixed capital appears severely constrained. These 
sectors include field crop and mixed farms in Denmark, dairy farms in East Germany, as well 
as mixed farms in Italy and the UK. The relationship between farm financial indicators and 
the estimated shadow prices of capital varies considerably across countries and sectors. 
Among the farms with a high shadow price for fixed capital in Denmark, high debt levels and 
little owned land tended to induce more intensive capital use, which may reflect the liberal 
Danish banking system. In East Germany, Italy and the UK, high debt levels made farmers 
more tightly capital constrained. Hence, in the latter group of countries, more traditional 
mechanisms of capital allocation based on debt capacity seemed to be at work. As a general 
conclusion, EU agriculture appears to be characterised by overcapitalisation rather than by 
credit constraints. 
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Drivers of agricultural capital productivity 
in selected EU member states 
Martin Petrick and Mathias Kloss* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 30/September 2012 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the assessment of capital productivity in European agriculture has 
increasingly become a matter of controversy. The conventional wisdom is that capital 
productivity at least in Western European agriculture is lower than in other sectors of the 
economy and lower than the return on financial assets (Henrichsmeyer and Witzke, 1991, p. 
387; Guan et al., 2006; Guan et al., 2009). Yet a survey of estimates of marginal capital 
productivity up to the 1990s showed widely varying outcomes (Witzke, 1993, p. 59). More 
recent studies on Central and East European (CEE) agriculture prior to EU accession found 
high marginal returns on capital, much above typical lending rates (Petrick, 2004a, b; Sarris 
et al., 2004). Based on bookkeeping data similar to those used in this study, Ciaian et al. 
(2011) argue that more intensive credit use boosted farm productivity in the CEE countries. 
The literature has come up with a number of explanations for these divergent findings. An 
excess utilisation of capital consistent with low partial productivities may be due to non-
pecuniary benefits (tractors as prestige objects) or the wish to provide safeguards against 
production risk (use of insurance contracts, precautionary investment in powerful machinery 
to mitigate production peaks; Witzke, 1993, p. 157). Aurbacher et al. (2011) have recently 
shown that farmers locked in small agricultural structures may be unable to coordinate on 
machinery sharing and thus may hold inefficiently high stocks of machinery. 
A second line of literature has argued that high levels of marginal capital productivity are a 
result of constrained access to capital. If farmers are facing borrowing constraints, they may 
not be able to build up a capital stock that equates on-farm return on capital with the going 
market interest rate. This argument has played an important role in the modernisation of 
CEE and East German agriculture, which was assumed to be subject to notable credit market 
imperfections (Swinnen and Gow, 1999; Hüttel et al., 2010). In the light of recent financial 
turmoil in Europe, access to capital and the possibility of credit rationing have become 
important for agriculture throughout the EU (Pietola et al., 2011). This reinforces earlier 
concerns about the impact of agricultural finance structures in different member states 
(Benjamin and Phimister, 2002). 
Against this background, this contribution empirically analyses the marginal return on 
capital in agriculture, based on individual farm data from seven EU member states. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the detection of credit market imperfections. The aim of the 
empirical study is to provide an updated set of capital productivity estimates for selected 
European countries. Furthermore, we come up with new evidence concerning the prevalence 
of credit rationing in the agricultural sectors of these countries. The key idea is to give farm 
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group-specific estimates of the shadow interest rate, and to use these to analyse the drivers of 
on-farm capital use in EU agriculture. 
In the following section we present a microeconomic model to provide a conceptual 
framework for the further analysis. We then discuss a number of issues in empirical 
implementation and summarise our empirical strategy. After introducing the database we 
explain the formation of subgroups. The results are presented in the penultimate section and 
are detailed in the appendix. The final section concludes. 
2. A simple model of the credit-constrained farm 
Assume a farmer maximises profit subject to a credit constraint. There is one output and one 
variable factor of production, which needs upfront financing and is thus fully credit funded. 
Revenue is used to repay debt and interest. Profit is then defined as revenue minus the costs 
of the input (Petrick, 2003): 
 
xrzxpfMax
x
)1(),( +−=π , subject to (1) 
 0≥− xK , (2) 
where π  is profit, f the production function, x variable input use, z other fixed inputs, r the 
market interest rate, p the output price and K the credit limit. f is monotonically increasing 
and concave in x and z. All prices are normalised by the input price. Solving this optimisation 
problem through the Lagrange method yields the following: from 
)()1(),( xKxrzxpfL −++−= η  with 0>x  and assuming that (2) is binding, we have the 
first-order condition 0)1(// =++−∂∂=∂∂ ηrxfpxL . η  is the Lagrange multiplier. 
Rearranging leads to 
 rrxfp +>+=∂∂ ∗ 11/ , with η+≡∗ rr . (3) 
We define ∗r  as the shadow price of capital on the farm; it represents the willingness to pay 
for credit. The marginal value product of the credit-financed input is thus equal to one plus 
the shadow price of capital. With a more severe credit constraint, the decision price for input 
use is increasing and input use is reduced. If there are several cooperating inputs on the farm 
and there are no other market imperfections, production and profit fall as a result of credit 
rationing. Public transfers or subsidy payments have the opposite effect. If household and 
production spheres of the farm compete for liquid funds, allocation decisions are no longer 
separable. Supply and demand equations can then only be derived from a fully specified 
household model (see Petrick, 2004a, b). A corresponding profit function of the credit-
constrained farm household can be written as 
 ),,,,( Kzzrp
hππ = , (4) 
with hz  a vector of fixed household characteristics. In (4), K assumes the role of a fixed factor 
if the credit limit is binding, and  
 
*/ rK =∂∂π  (5) 
provides another measure of the shadow interest rate. 
The above model serves as a useful motivation for measuring capital productivity and capital 
market imperfections in agriculture. Market imperfections exist if (2) is binding, that is not 
all profitable farm operations can be performed and there is an excess demand for liquid 
funds. The market imperfection may be due to unsolved problems of financial 
intermediation, for example arising from asymmetric information or divergent views by the 
farmer and the credit supplier about uncertain farming outcomes (Swinnen and Gow, 1999; 
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Barry and Robison, 2001; Curtiss, 2012). The severity of this market imperfection is directly 
reflected in the level of ∗r .  
Having established this measure of capital market imperfection, we hypothesise that certain 
financial and management characteristics of the farm can explain the severity of this 
constraint. Holding constant the influence of other factors, a positive effect of farm 
indebtedness is consistent with the view that more leveraged farms face restrictions on 
capital markets that prevent them from driving down their capital productivities. A negative 
effect may imply the presence of excess borrowing beyond economically rational returns, and 
thus also an inefficiency of agricultural capital markets. A negative impact of the level of farm 
assets, such as land, signals the importance of collateral, as farms less endowed with land 
may be less able to make use of mortgage credit. Corporate farms are assumed to be less 
attractive clients for lenders, as they are often subject to liability restrictions. Finally, we posit 
that older farmers have a longer credit history and therefore better credit access (Barry et al., 
2000). They may also be more experienced and better endowed with wealth than younger 
operators. Beyond a certain age, however, a lack of relevant training and uncertainties 
concerning the farm successor may also make borrowing more difficult.  
3. Issues in empirical implementation 
A consistent measure of ∗r  provides a useful starting point for analysing the drivers of capital 
use and the determinants of capital market imperfections. Farm-individual predictions of the 
shadow interest rate allow comparisons of capital use among different types of farms in 
various regional settings. Furthermore, their determinants can be analysed in a second-stage 
regression, using other farm characteristics as explanatory variables. Even so, there are two 
basic issues in measuring ∗r  empirically: 
1) Primal vs. dual estimation. Estimation could be based on the primal model (3) or the 
dual model (5). Data requirements for the two approaches are different: (3) requires 
the specification of a production function, with appropriate measurement of outputs 
and inputs, while (5) requires data on profits, prices and fixed factors, including the 
credit limit. 
2) How to measure the a priori credit rationing status. Note that (5) is only defined for a 
binding credit constraint, i.e. equality in (2). Yet K is usually unobserved, so whether 
the constraint is binding for a given farm is hard to determine. While all relevant 
variables are principally observed for estimating (3), x is endogenous if the credit 
constraint is not binding. 
Previous studies have used both primal and dual approaches and a variety of techniques to 
measure the credit rationing status (cf. Petrick, 2005, for a survey). Carter and Wiebe (1990) 
and Petrick (2003) are examples of the primal approach, based on a production function 
estimation. On the other hand, Feder et al. (1990), Sial and Carter (1996) and Petrick 
(2004a) implicitly or explicitly use the dual approach.1 Blancard et al. (2006) identify 
“financial inefficiency” (as an indicator of credit rationing) by measuring the distance 
between an unconstrained profit function and the credit-constrained profit function, 
following the non-parametric approach to frontier profit by Färe et al. (1990). A key issue in 
choosing among the approaches is data availability. Except for Blancard et al. (2006), all 
studies worked with cross-sectional data in which price variation was negligible or assumed 
to be absent. Estimation thus focused on specifying an appropriate set of variable and/or 
fixed production factors and the credit limit. 
This leads to the fundamental problem of how to measure the credit rationing status of a 
single farm. Following the model above, information on the level of both x and K is required 
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to determine whether (2) is binding. As liquidity is highly fungible, particularly the latter is 
notoriously difficult to measure. In the literature, there have been three broad approaches to 
deal with this issue: 
a) Missing information about K, a first group of studies assumes that all farms (Carter and 
Wiebe, 1990) or all borrowers (Sial and Carter, 1996) are credit constrained and that 
observed input expenditures are equal to the credit limit. This is also the assumption 
made by Färe et al. (1990) and Blancard et al. (2006). Of course, there may be 
borrowers who took some credit, but not up to their limit, so this assumption may lead 
to misspecification of models and an overestimation of the prevalence of credit 
rationing. 
b) A second group uses direct elicitation of credit constraints to overcome the previous 
weakness. In specifically designed questionnaires, potential and actual borrowers are 
asked whether they perceive their credit ration as binding. Building on pioneering work 
by Feder et al. (1990) and others, this approach was used by Petrick (2003) and 
(2004a) in the context of a shadow price analysis for Poland.2 
c) Without the information necessary for approach (b), a third approach uses other 
observable criteria to group the data into a priori credit constrained and unconstrained 
farms. This approach has been especially widespread in the investment literature (cf. 
Petrick, 2005). Typical criteria are high vs. low debt, tenanted vs. owned (Benjamin and 
Phimister, 2002), asset levels of farms, their debt-to-asset ratio and the age of the 
operator. 
For the present study, the data available from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
cover a panel of farm-individual data from selected European countries. These data are rich 
in farm characteristics, factor use, output and financial statements, including balance sheet 
data. They are less detailed in price data and they have no specific information on credit 
rationing status. As a main interest is in the drivers and impacts of capital use, a production 
function approach is used in the following analysis.  
As summarised by Griliches and Mairesse (1998), estimating production functions from 
micro data involves a number of econometric challenges. Individual farm output may be 
affected by unobserved characteristics of the farm. These characteristics may be owing to 
“management bias” as introduced to the literature by Mundlak (1961) or reflect socio-
demographic or geographical characteristics of the farm that are constant over time. For 
example, soil fertility, the management ability of farmers and technology are supposed to be 
correlated with inputs. If panel data are available as in our case, the typical way to eliminate 
the influence of these factors is to use a fixed-effects or “within groups” estimator (Greene, 
2008, p. 191). This will also eliminate the influence of fixed factors captured in z (equation 1). 
While the entire spectrum of flexible functional forms is available for estimating the 
production function, the Cobb Douglas model is often used as a convenient starting point for 
empirical analysis (e.g. by Carter and Wiebe, 1990 and Petrick, 2003). Even so, it imposes a 
lot of structure on the data, including homogeneity and strong separability of factors 
(Chambers, 1988). The testing of more flexible functional forms may thus be desirable. We 
experimented with a translog formulation, which combined with the fixed effects approach 
did not yield satisfying results. Most interaction terms were poorly identified and the 
parameters led to widely varying shadow prices. We therefore resorted to the traditional 
Cobb Douglas model and combined it with a procedure of group-wise time demeaning, 
thereby eliminating fixed effects. We leave more flexible functional forms for future research, 
for example using the control function approach of Olley and Pakes (1996) and its recent 
modifications.  
                                                        
2 This approach continues to be refined in the development economics literature (Boucher et al., 
2009). 
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The parameters of the production functions are used to calculate farm-individual (net) 
shadow prices of fixed and working capital according to subgroups following equation (3). 
This means we have multiplied the estimated production elasticities from the production 
function of the relevant farm subgroup with the average capital productivity of each farm in 
that group, subtracted one and expressed the result as a percentage. We then pool the 
shadow prices for high debt and low debt farms and use a second-stage ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression to analyse the determinants of these shadow prices. We include the debt-to-
asset ratio per farm, the amount of owned land as a source of collateral, the legal form and 
the age of the manager as regressors. 
The following analysis thus proceeds in four steps: 
1) Subgroups of farms are formed based on country, farm type and a priori credit 
rationing status. 
2) Cobb Douglas production functions for the subgroups are estimated, allowing for 
varying technology parameters in each subgroup. 
3) Based on the estimated production elasticities, shadow prices of fixed and working 
capital are calculated. 
4) The drivers of capital productivity are analysed in a second-stage regression of shadow 
prices, separately for countries, farm types and fixed vs. working capital. 
4. Database 
The FADN provides a farm level data set that holds accountancy data for 25 of the 27 EU 
member states. Each year about 80,000 farms are sampled. They represent a population of 
about 5,000,000 farms in the member states. In each member state a liaison agency is 
responsible for the data collection and transmission, which consists of about 1,000 variables 
including structural, economic and financial data. To represent the heterogeneity of farms, a 
stratified sample is obtained. The stratification criteria are region, economic size and type of 
farming.  
The farm universe consists of all farms with more than one hectare or those with less than 
one hectare that provide the market with a specified amount of output. From this universe all 
non-commercial farms are excluded in order to arrive at the field of observation. To be 
classified as a commercial farm, a farm must exceed a certain economic size. It is measured in 
economic size units (ESU). One ESU represents a certain amount in euros and is periodically 
adjusted for inflation. To determine the economic size of farms, the concept of standard gross 
margin is used. In addition, farms are classified by type of farming. 
The raw data provided by FADN was arranged in a way that panel data estimators can be 
applied. For every country and sector in the study, we created a panel data set covering the 
years from 2001 up to 2008. For Poland and Slovakia, the first year of data is 2004. 
Therefore, these panels only cover five years. A small number of duplicates in the data were 
dropped.3 
The variables and their measurement are readily available in the codebooks provided by 
FADN. Output is measured as the total farm output in euros. Labour is measured by the time 
worked in hours by total labour input on the farm, including both hired and family labour. 
The total utilised agricultural area is our land input in ha. It includes owned and rented land, 
and land in sharecropping.  
A persistent issue in estimating production functions has been the specification of the capital 
variable. Typically, some simple measures of input quantities (such as fertilisers or 
pesticides) and machinery use (such as fuel expenses or tractor hours) are used in the cross-
sectional studies. More sophisticated approaches use inventory methods to estimate real 
                                                        
3 Duplicates likely arise from the fact that farms run legally separate operations in several regions. 
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capital service flows, by making assumptions about depreciation and capital rental rates 
(Andersen et al., 2011). In this study, the material or working capital input is proxied by total 
intermediate consumption in euros. It consists of total specific costs and overheads arising 
from production in the accounting year. Among others, it includes feed, fuel, lubricants, 
water, electricity and seed. Fixed capital inputs are approximated by depreciation of capital 
assets estimated at replacement value in euros. This variable includes plantations of 
permanent crops, farm buildings and fixed equipment, land improvements, machinery, 
equipment and forest plantations. Cows are measured in livestock units (LU) per farm, 
following the standard FADN conversion rates. 
The determinants of capital use are measured as follows. The debt-to-asset ratio is calculated 
by the total liabilities divided by total assets. Owned land is constructed by subtracting the 
utilised area of rented land from the total utilised area. Corporate is an indicator variable that 
takes on the value of one if the observed farm is a corporation (i.e. neither a family nor a 
partnership farm). Lastly, we include the age of the farm manager in years. Table 1 
summarises the variable definitions and gives the actual FADN codes. 
Table 1. Selection of variables 
FADN code Variable description 
Outputs  
SE131 Total output (€) 
Inputs  
SE011 Labour input (hours) 
SE025 Total utilised agricultural area (ha) 
SE275 Total intermediate consumption (€) = working capital 
SE360 Depreciation (€) = fixed capital 
SE085 Dairy cows (livestock units; in dairy and mixed farms) 
Determinants of shadow prices 
SE485/SE436 Debt-to-asset ratio 
SE025-SE030 Owned land (ha) 
A18 Corporate farm (1/0) 
C01YR Age of manager (years) 
Source: FADN data. 
All monetary values are deflated to real values in 2005 prices using respective price indices. 
The information was extracted from the Eurostat online database and merged with the 
panels. Output was deflated by the agricultural output price index. Fixed capital was deflated 
by the agricultural input price index for goods and services contributing to agricultural 
investment, and working capital by the agricultural input price index for goods and services 
currently consumed in agriculture. 
Outliers were identified on the basis of the average, fixed capital productivity per farm (real 
SE131/real SE360). Observations were dropped for the production function estimation if 
their value was beyond the median ± 1.5 the interquartile range. For the shadow price 
regression, outliers in the dependent variable were dropped using the same criterion. 
5. Selection of farm and country subgroups 
As the FADN data do not contain any specific information about the credit rationing status of 
farms, the formation of subsamples based on suitable indicators available in the data was a 
crucial step in the analysis (approach (c) above). Subgroups were drawn according to three 
criteria: 
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1) member state, 
2) farm type, and 
3) a priori credit rationing status. 
Different member states reflect different structural and political conditions as well as 
different banking systems. Stratification according to farm type is desirable to make farms 
comparable and to justify the assumption of a homogenous production technology implicit in 
the production function estimates. The credit rationing status shall facilitate the 
interpretation of diverging returns on capital as outlined above. 
The member states selected for the study include major agricultural producers as well as 
diverse agricultural finance structures (Table 2). The spectrum is from large-scale (often 
corporate) farms in East Germany and Slovakia to medium-sized commercial farms in 
Denmark, France and the UK, and down to small family farms in West Germany, Italy and 
Poland. Not less diverse, agricultural finance systems vary from highly competitive and 
liberal in Denmark and the UK to the typical cooperative banking sectors in Germany and 
France, as well as a specialised sector bank in Slovakia and a generally low penetration of 
capital in Italy and Poland. As East and West Germany are structurally so distinct, we treat 
them separately in the following analysis. East Germany contains the five states 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and Saxony. West 
Germany contains all other states except Berlin and Bremen, which are not represented in 
the FADN data. 
Table 2. Selection of countries 
Country Agricultural structure  
(as represented in the data) 
Agricultural finance 
Denmark (DK) Medium-scale farms, highly 
commercialised 
Liberal lending; high investment and 
financial leverage in agriculture 
France (FR) Medium-scale family farms Centralised, cooperative banking 
sector; preferential lending rates for 
agriculture 
Germany East 
(DEE) and West 
(DEW) 
Small- to medium-scale family farms 
(West); large corporate farms (East) 
Mixed cooperative, savings and 
commercial banks; lower debt 
capacity in the East 
Italy (IT) Small-scale family farms Very low financial leverage 
Poland (PL) Small-scale family farms Cooperative banking sector, 
emerging commercial banks, 
preferential lending rates, low 
investment levels 
Slovakia (SK) Large corporate farms Specialised agricultural bank, low 
investment levels 
United Kingdom 
(UK) 
Medium-scale farms, highly 
commercialised 
Lending primarily by non-specialised 
commercial banks; traditionally a 
focus on overdraft loans 
Sources: Authors based on Pietola et al. (2011); Benjamin and Phimister (2002); European Commission 
(2010); FADN data. 
Our farm type classification follows the TF8 scheme of the FADN and includes three 
dominant farm types: 
• field crops (TF1), 
• specialised dairy farms (TF5), and 
• mixed farms (TF8). 
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While the first two represent specialised and fairly homogeneous production technologies, 
the third type was included for its quantitative importance in many member states. 
For the a priori classification into credit constrained and unconstrained farms, we followed 
Bierlen & Featherstone (1998) and Benjamin & Phimister (2002) in using the debt-to-asset 
ratio as a separation criterion. For each farm in the sample, we calculated the average debt-
to-asset ratio over the years the farm was included in the sample. If this value was below the 
median debt-to-asset ratio in the respective country/farm type subsample, the farm with all 
its years of observation was classified as ‘low debt’ or a priori unconstrained, or otherwise as 
‘high debt’ or constrained. For the calculation of the median, only farms with a non-zero 
debt-to-asset ratio were considered. This led to much bigger unconstrained subsamples in 
Italy and Poland, as many farms have zero debt in these countries. 
6. Results 
In the following discussion, the main results concerning the potential presence of capital 
constraints and the drivers of marginal capital productivity are presented, separated by 
capital and farm type. Detailed results by country are compiled in the appendix of this paper. 
The latter includes distributional charts of shadow prices, descriptive statistics of all 
variables, estimates of the production function parameters by subgroup, as well as mean 
comparison tests and regression tables of shadow prices. 
The upper part of each of the following tables summarises the main results concerning the 
presence of capital market imperfections. It starts with a statement about whether the 
production function estimation could at all identify the capital elasticity with sufficient 
statistical precision. If an elasticity could not be identified, all of the following statements 
suffer from a severe methodological caveat, as the empirical basis for these statements is very 
weak. Columns to which this caveat applies appear in pale letters. The second row asks 
whether the shadow price of capital on the a priori credit constrained, high-debt farms is 
significantly higher than that on low-debt farms. This statement is based on the t-tests 
reported in the appendix. If the answer is yes this outcome supports the view that highly 
leveraged farms are more tightly capital constrained, as they cannot equalise their marginal 
capital productivity with the low-debt farms. It is thus the first evidence of a credit market 
imperfection. The third row states whether the estimated shadow prices were excessively 
higher than typical interest rates on agricultural loan markets. Such loan rates were compiled 
recently by Pietola et al. (2011) and are reproduced in Figure 1. Our table statements are 
based on simple numerical comparisons between these interest rates and the internal shadow 
prices of farms. 
The lower section of each table summarises the outcomes of the shadow price regressions. 
For age, we included a quadratic term to capture the potential non-linearities outlined above. 
Significantly positive or negative coefficients are indicated by + and −, while “0” denotes a 
non-significant effect. Due to lack of data, some variables could not be included for some 
groups, and are thus marked by “n.a.” (not applicable). 
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Figure 1. Agricultural loan rates in EU member countries (%) 
 
Note: Loan rates represent interest payments weighted by outstanding loans and are thus averages over all 
loan categories. 
Source: Authors based on aggregate FADN data on the website of the European Commission, DG for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/database/database_en.cfm). 
 
6.1 Fixed capital 
Table 3 to Table 5 summarise the results with regard to fixed capital on field crops, dairy and 
mixed farms, respectively. The fixed capital elasticity is commonly identified by the 
production function in all country subgroups, with the exception of East German field crops, 
Polish and Slovak dairy and Slovak mixed farms. The Polish and Slovak samples contain 
fewer years than the other countries, which may have contributed to the poor identification of 
the capital variable. In 12 out of 24 cases was the mean shadow price of fixed capital higher 
for high-debt farms than for low-debt farms. This is usefully illustrated by the combined 
histograms of high-debt and low-debt farms in the appendix, which show the distribution of 
shadow prices per farm group. In cases where high-debt farms display higher shadow prices 
than low-debt farms, the red distributions (constrained) peak further to the right than the 
white ones (unconstrained).  
Despite this evidence in favour of debt effects on shadow prices, only in five cases were the 
calculated shadow prices excessively higher than typical interest rates. This finding applies to 
Danish field crops, East German dairy farms, and Danish, Italian and British mixed farms. In 
addition, the distributions of shadow prices for Slovak and British field crop farms display a 
notable tail to the right, indicating that at least a subsample of farms is constrained. It thus 
appears that credit rationing is an issue only in some specific sectors and countries, whereas 
in a majority of cases marginal returns on capital in agriculture are quite low. In many of the 
subsamples where we found no excessive levels of shadow prices this marginal return was 
actually highly negative (see the tables in the appendix). 
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Table 3. Field crop farms, fixed capital 
 DK FR DEE DEW IT PL SK UK 
Capital elasticity 
identified 
yes yes no yes low debt 
only 
yes low debt 
only 
yes 
Mean shadow price 
high debt > low debt 
no yes yes yes no yes no yes 
Excessive average 
shadow price level 
yes no no no no no no no 
Effect on shadow price 
Debt-to-asset ratio − + + + − + − + 
Owned land (ha) + − + 0 + + 0 − 
Corporate farm (1/0) + 0 − n.a. + − − + 
Age of manager − − − − + + n.a. − 
Age square + 0 + 0 − − n.a. + 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on FADN data. 
Among the five groups with excessive shadow prices for fixed capital, only the UK displays 
the expected positive relationship between debt-to-asset and shadow price and a negative 
coefficient on owned land. In the other cases, owned land has a positive sign, while the debt-
to-asset sign varies. It seems they deserve a differentiated interpretation, as these farmers 
operate in rather diverse contexts. In the two Danish groups of field crops and mixed farms, 
farms with a higher debt-to-asset ratio and less owned land show lower shadow prices of 
fixed capital, and thus appear less constrained. This is consistent with liberal lending policies 
in the past, which led to high capital inflows regardless of the availability of collateral. The 
direction of causality between shadow prices and debt levels deserves further scrutiny in this 
case. 
The rather distinct cases of large East German dairy farms and relatively small Italian mixed 
farms experience higher shadow prices if the debt-to-asset ratio is also high. This outcome is 
more in line with the view that high indebtedness makes capital access more difficult. As land 
ownership by operators is less widespread in East Germany, land may be less relevant as 
collateral, which in turn may explain the positive sign of the land variable in this case.  
Table 4. Dairy farms, fixed capital 
 DK FR DEE DEW IT PL SK UK 
Capital elasticity 
identified 
low debt 
only 
yes high 
debt 
only 
yes yes no no high 
debt 
only 
Mean shadow price 
high debt > low debt 
no no yes yes no no yes yes 
Excessive average 
shadow price level 
no no yes no no no no no 
Effect on shadow price 
Debt-to-asset ratio − − + + − + + + 
Owned land (ha) − − + + + + 0 0 
Corporate farm (1/0) 0 0 0 n.a. + n.a. 0 0 
Age of manager 0 − 0 − 0 0 n.a. + 
Age square 0 − 0 + 0 0 n.a. − 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on FADN data. 
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In all groups with excessive shadow prices of fixed capital, the corporate farms display higher 
shadow prices (or no effect in East German dairy farms). This is consistent with the 
presumption that liability regulations constrain the capital access of corporate farms. On the 
other hand, the influence of the age of the manager appears to be small, most frequently it is 
not statistically different from zero. 
Throughout the tables, the sign of the debt-to-asset ratio confirms the outcome of the mean 
comparison between high-debt and low-debt farms in the upper part of the tables. 
Among the farm groups with very low (usually negative) shadow rates, capital market 
imperfections in the classical sense of limited credit access appear to be less relevant in 
general. It is thus questionable whether the reported financial indicators contribute much to 
understanding these low rates. One of the apparent regularities is that in France and West 
Germany the shadow prices of fixed capital are typically the lower the older the farm 
manager, regardless of farm type. In both countries, this may be an indication of excess 
capital use for other than purely economic reasons, such as prestige or strong risk aversion, 
which could be more pronounced among the older farmers. 
Table 5. Mixed farms, fixed capital 
 DK FR DEE DEW IT PL SK UK 
Capital elasticity 
identified 
yes yes low 
debt 
only 
yes yes yes no yes 
Mean shadow price 
high debt > low debt 
no yes no no yes yes no yes 
Excessive average 
shadow price level 
yes no no no yes no no yes 
Effect on shadow price 
Debt-to-asset ratio − + − + + + − + 
Owned land (ha) + − 0 + + + − − 
Corporate farm (1/0) + 0 + n.a. + − − + 
Age of manager 0 0 0 − 0 + n.a. + 
Age square 0 0 0 + + − n.a. − 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on FADN data. 
 
6.2 Working capital 
The working capital estimates in Table 6 to Table 8 almost all identified the capital elasticity. 
This is expected, as the within-group variation in working capital is typically higher than in 
fixed capital. In the minority of cases (10) is the mean shadow price of working capital higher 
for high-debt farms than for low-debt farms. Credit constraints may thus be less binding for 
working capital than for fixed capital. The latter presumption is forcefully supported by the 
finding that shadow price levels were excessive in only one case (Danish mixed farms). Some 
farms in the shadow price distributions of Danish, French and Italian field crop and West 
German dairy farms appear constrained. However, most shadow prices were negative on 
average. 
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Table 6. Field crop farms, working capital 
 DK FR DEE DEW IT PL SK UK 
Capital elasticity 
identified 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Mean shadow price 
high debt > low debt 
yes no yes yes no no no no 
Excessive average 
shadow price level 
no no no no low debt 
only 
no no no 
Effect on shadow price 
Debt-to-asset ratio − − + + − − − − 
Owned land (ha) + − + − − − + + 
Corporate farm (1/0) + 0 − n.a. + 0 + 0 
Age of manager + 0 0 0 + + n.a. + 
Age square 0 0 0 0 − − n.a. − 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on FADN data. 
Debt-to-asset ratios often have a negative impact on shadow rates, while the effect of owned 
land varies quite a bit. Taken together, this is an indication that factors other than borrowing 
constraints drive the low values of working capital productivity. The age of the manager 
seems to have an effect on shadow rates less often than for fixed capital, and the same applies 
to the corporate structure of the farm. 
Table 7. Dairy farms, working capital 
 DK FR DEE DEW IT PL SK UK 
Capital elasticity 
identified 
yes yes yes yes yes yes low debt 
only 
yes 
Mean shadow price 
high debt > low debt 
yes no yes yes no yes no yes 
Excessive average 
shadow price level 
no no no no no no no no 
Effect on shadow price 
Debt-to-asset ratio − − + + − + − 0 
Owned land (ha) + − + − − 0 0 + 
Corporate farm (1/0) 0 0 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 0 
Age of manager + − + 0 − + n.a. + 
Age square − + − + + − n.a. − 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on FADN data. 
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Table 8. Mixed farms, working capital 
 DK FR DEE DEW IT PL SK UK 
Capital elasticity 
identified 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Mean shadow price 
high debt > low debt 
no no yes yes no no no no 
Excessive average 
shadow price level 
yes no no no no no no no 
Effect on shadow price 
Debt-to-asset ratio + − + + − − − − 
Owned land (ha) + − + + − − 0 0 
Corporate farm (1/0) 0 − − n.a. + 0 + 0 
Age of manager 0 0 0 + 0 0 n.a. 0 
Age square 0 0 0 + 0 0 n.a. 0 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on FADN data. 
7. Conclusions 
Our empirical analysis of marginal capital productivity in the agricultural sector of seven EU 
member states has produced the following main insights. First, working capital is typically 
used in more than economically optimal quantities and displays commonly negative marginal 
returns across countries and farm types. This is less often the case with fixed capital, but it is 
only a small set of sectors where access to fixed capital appears severely constrained. These 
sectors include field crop and mixed farms in Denmark, dairy farms in East Germany, as well 
as mixed farms in Italy and the UK. 
Second, the relationship between farm financial indicators and the estimated shadow prices 
of capital varies considerably across countries and sectors. Among the farms with a high 
shadow price for fixed capital in Denmark, high debt levels and little owned land tended to 
induce more intensive capital use. The latter may be an indicator of the liberal Danish 
banking system. In East Germany, Italy and the UK, high debt levels made farmers more 
tightly capital constrained if their shadow rates indicated some constrained capital access in 
the first place. Hence, in the latter group of countries, more traditional mechanisms of capital 
allocation based on debt capacity seemed to be at work. 
With these exceptions in mind, EU farmers typically do not face serious constraints in 
accessing capital. Based on our findings, it seems fair to say that (economically) excessive 
capital use is the rule. In France and West Germany, marginal returns to fixed capital are 
particularly low on farms with older operators, which may indicate non-pecuniary benefits 
from capital use or a risk-averse accumulation of capital stocks to mitigate production peaks. 
As a general conclusion, EU agriculture appears to be dominated more by overcapitalisation 
than by credit constraints. This statement is broadly in line with other recent studies of 
capital use in individual European countries (Aurbacher et al., 2011; Guan et al., 2009). It 
also holds for the two new member states in our sample, Poland and Slovakia, and thus 
qualifies the finding of Ciaian et al. (2011), according to which credit use increased farm 
productivity in the new member states. Yet our findings are less robust for these two cases 
due to a smaller sample size and problems with identification in the production function 
estimations. 
One policy conclusion is apparent from the findings presented in this study. Capital subsidies 
have been part of the Common Agricultural Policy for a long time and are also provided by 
many national governments. If EU farmers typically use too much capital, with regard to both 
fixed and working capital, there is little economic justification for such subsidies, and future 
policy reforms should aim at downsizing their importance.  
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We conclude with some limitations of our findings and suggestions for further research. The 
previous results are subject to the assumptions that provided the basis for the empirical 
analysis. For example, the assumption of a Cobb Douglas technology in the production 
function estimates is rather rigid. Among other restrictions, it rules out multiple equilibria of 
locally optimal capital use. It thus may conceal traps associated with low asset levels, in 
which capital returns are low although capital use is also low. Such circumstances may, for 
example, be present in countries dominated by small and less commercially oriented farms, 
such as Italy or Poland. As our attempt to combine more flexible functional forms with a 
fixed effects regression was not successful, this also calls for alternative estimation 
approaches. For example, a control function approach to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity may be more appropriate for modelling flexible production technologies. 
Our relatively simple conceptual framework does not explicitly account for the dynamic and 
risk-related considerations of the decision-makers. More complex models may provide more 
differentiated insights into the allocation patterns of fixed capital in particular. 
Taking the finding of a widespread excess of capitalisation in agriculture for granted, there is 
a need to better understand the drivers behind this outcome. Such an analysis should look at 
both the demand side and the supply side of agricultural capital markets (Kataria et al., 
2012). The motives and strategies of farm managers to invest in capital require a more careful 
evaluation. Imperfections in the arrangements of machinery sharing provide an interesting 
avenue of further research (Aurbacher et al., 2011) and the role of agricultural subsidies 
should be investigated further (Ciaian and Pokrivcak, 2011). Moreover, there is a definite 
need for a more detailed examination of the manifold institutional environments in the 
agricultural banking sectors in Europe. 
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Appendix: Results by selected member states 
 
Denmark 
France 
Germany (East) 
Germany (West) 
Italy 
Poland 
Slovakia 
United Kingdom 
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Denmark 
Figure A1. Shadow prices of fixed capital 
 
 
Figure A2. Shadow prices of working capital 
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Table A1. Denmark: Descriptive statistics and mean comparison of shadow prices 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Output (ths €) 1881 145.10 2140 273.61 1334 330.82 1300 476.45 1327 449.56 1279 650.36 
Labour (ths hours) 1881 2.28 2140 3.53 1334 4.53 1300 5.30 1327 4.42 1279 6.00 
Land (ha) 1881 96.89 2140 152.42 1334 103.81 1300 136.40 1327 133.87 1279 183.24 
Working capital (ths €) 1881 86.70 2140 167.26 1334 208.05 1300 302.52 1327 316.72 1279 461.64 
Fixed capital (ths €) 1881 23.96 2140 42.44 1334 42.50 1300 61.54 1327 61.65 1279 87.64 
Cows (LU) -- -- -- -- 1334 100.27 1300 139.59 1327 12.23 1279 11.85 
Debt-to-asset ratio 1881 0.23 2140 0.63 1334 0.47 1300 0.80 1327 0.44 1279 0.79 
Owned land (ha) 1881 72.36 2140 94.02 1334 79.37 1300 97.59 1327 98.32 1279 121.51 
Corporate farm (1/0) 1881 0.03 2140 0.05 1334 0.04 1300 0.07 1327 0.04 1279 0.05 
Age of manager (years) 1881 48.73 2140 57.28 1334 55.37 1300 61.86 1327 53.73 1279 59.99 
Shadow price of fixed 
capital (%) 
1881 37.06 2140 25.72 1334 -35.07 1300 -67.26 1327 92.88 1279 38.01 
p(high debt>low debt) >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
p(high debt<low debt) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Shadow price of 
working capital (%) 
1881 -16.27 2140 -12.93 1334 -45.81 1300 -43.73 1327 -3.95 1279 12.72 
p(high debt>low debt) 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 
p(high debt<low debt) 0.998 >0.999 >0.999 
Notes: LU=livestock units. P-values based on two-sample t-test for paired data. 
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Table A2. Denmark: Production elasticities based on production function estimates (Cobb Douglas fixed effects) 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
Labour 0.31 0.27 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.11 
Land 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.01# -0.03# 0.01# 
Working capital 0.57 0.58 0.35 0.36 0.72 0.83 
Fixed capital 0.23 0.20 0.08# 0.04# 0.27 0.18 
Cows -- -- 0.43 0.43 0.01# < 0.01# 
No. of observations 1881 2140 1334 1300 1327 1279 
No. of farms 722 863 473 446 589 534 
Notes: All estimates based on group-demeaned variables (fixed effects regression). Year dummies are included but results not shown. All coefficients are significant at 
least at the 5% level except when marked with #, based on standard errors robust to clustering in groups. 
 
Table A3. Determinants of shadow prices (pooled OLS) 
 Fixed capital Working capital 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Debt-to-asset ratio -19.75*** 3.97 -51.16*** 1.73 -82.18*** 5.40 -9.63*** 2.47 -1.79** 0.79 16.48*** 2.11 
Owned land (ha) 0.04*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.01 
Corporate farm 
(1/0) 
20.96*** 4.78 -0.72 1.72 21.70*** 4.83 18.15*** 3.32 0.57 0.75 2.25 1.94 
Age of manager -1.56** 0.62 0.02 0.43 0.72 1.18 0.72** 0.37 0.50*** 0.16 0.60 0.44 
Age square 0.02*** 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 -0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 >-0.01** <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
R² 0.093 0.429 0.166 0.123 0.164 0.223 
No. of observations 4022 2634 2607 4022 2634 2607 
*** (**, *) significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
Notes: Year dummies and constant are included but results not shown. Outliers in dependent variable eliminated prior to estimation. 
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France 
Figure A3. Shadow prices of fixed capital 
 
 
Figure A4. Shadow prices of working capital 
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Table A4. France: Descriptive statistics and mean comparison of shadow prices 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Output (ths €) 6704 125.67 6920 166.63 3418 101.55 3775 144.38 4034 153.39 3829 221.53 
Labour (ths hours) 6704 2.89 6920 3.58 3418 2.83 3775 3.35 4034 3.31 3829 3.81 
Land (ha) 6704 120.56 6920 143.34 3418 72.91 3775 87.70 4034 112.79 3829 126.80 
Working capital (ths €) 6704 83.54 6920 112.49 3418 65.31 3775 97.42 4034 108.67 3829 162.41 
Fixed capital (ths €) 6704 29.43 6920 36.31 3418 23.82 3775 31.51 4034 33.45 3829 44.31 
Cows (LU) -- -- -- -- 3418 42.35 3775 53.71 4034 24.48 3829 35.53 
Debt-to-asset ratio 6701 0.24 6919 0.61 3418 0.20 3775 0.50 4025 0.28 3829 0.59 
Owned land (ha) 6704 18.59 6920 9.92 3418 13.36 3775 6.75 4034 13.76 3829 6.61 
Corporate farm (1/0) 6704 0.00 6920 0.01 3418 0.00 3775 0.00 4034 0.00 3829 0.00 
Age of manager (years) 6691 55.50 6903 58.36 3409 57.37 3757 60.37 4009 57.50 3808 60.51 
Shadow price of fixed 
capital (%) 
6704 -56.34 6920 -40.24 3418 -60.32 3775 -69.87 4034 -48.59 3829 -34.80 
p(high debt>low debt) <0.001 >0.999 <0.001 
p(high debt<low debt) >0.999 <0.001 >0.999 
Shadow price of 
working capital (%) 
6704 8.17 6920 5.79 3418 -16.76 3775 -23.14 4034 -0.28 3829 -1.42 
p(high debt>low debt) >0.999 >0.999 0.989 
p(high debt<low debt) <0.001 <0.001 0.011 
Notes: LU=livestock units. P-values based on two-sample t-test for paired data. 
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Table A5. France: Production elasticities based on production function estimates (Cobb Douglas fixed effects) 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
Labour 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 
Land 0.16 0.04# 0.03# 0.13 0.12 0.02# 
Working capital 0.73 0.72 0.53 0.51 0.72 0.71 
Fixed capital 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.12 
Cows -- -- 0.33 0.26 0.02 0.02 
No. of observations 6704 6920 3418 3775 4034 3829 
No. of farms 1502 1580 838 1049 1087 1026 
Notes: All estimates based on group-demeaned variables (fixed effects regression). Year dummies are included but results not shown. All coefficients are significant at 
least at the 5% level except when marked with #, based on standard errors robust to clustering in groups. 
 
Table A6. Determinants of shadow prices (pooled OLS) 
 Fixed capital Working capital 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Debt-to-asset ratio 19.11*** 1.18 -15.16*** 1.05 28.14*** 1.60 -11.59*** 0.94 -18.11*** 0.96 -12.33*** 1.24 
Owned land (ha) -0.08*** 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.01 -0.13*** 0.01 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.18*** 0.01 
Corporate farm (1/0) -0.27 3.07 0.54 4.18 5.99 7.10 0.49 3.07 -8.57 5.32 -14.50* 7.67 
Age of manager -0.65*** 0.22 -1.61*** 0.25 -0.36 0.40 0.21 0.26 -1.05*** 0.23 -0.29 0.36 
Age square <0.01 <0.01 >-0.01*** <0.01 >-0.01 <0.01 >-0.01 <0.01 0.01*** <0.01 <0.01 0.00 
R² 0.081 0.067 0.070 0.113 0.086 0.077 
No. of observations 13592 7168 7821 13592 7168 7821 
*** (**, *) significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
Notes: Year dummies and constant are included but results not shown. Outliers in dependent variable eliminated prior to estimation. 
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Germany (East) 
Figure A5. Shadow prices of fixed capital 
 
 
Figure A6. Shadow prices of working capital 
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Table A7. Germany (East): Descriptive statistics and mean comparison of shadow prices 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Output (ths €) 1692 851.00 1673 552.20 723 880.03 703 487.29 1264 1658.68 1247 841.78 
Labour (ths hours) 1692 24.13 1673 15.49 723 29.68 703 12.22 1264 50.26 1247 24.45 
Land (ha) 1692 713.71 1673 574.64 723 428.98 703 259.66 1264 1052.61 1247 616.57 
Working capital (ths €) 1692 596.33 1673 413.83 723 604.69 703 340.58 1264 1178.69 1247 627.13 
Fixed capital (ths €) 1692 130.18 1673 86.35 723 120.94 703 68.21 1264 238.96 1247 119.79 
Cows (LU) -- -- -- -- 723 236.53 703 159.77 1264 268.30 1247 153.79 
Debt-to-asset ratio 1692 0.19 1673 0.67 723 0.24 703 0.73 1264 0.19 1247 0.61 
Owned land (ha) 1692 90.23 1673 76.35 723 51.65 703 42.13 1264 126.98 1247 67.86 
Corporate farm (1/0) 1692 0.29 1673 0.16 723 0.28 703 0.07 1264 0.60 1247 0.28 
Age of manager (years) 1079 53.37 1320 57.31 510 54.87 610 55.77 458 53.79 834 55.27 
Shadow price of fixed 
capital (%) 
1692 -77.79 1673 -71.33 723 -59.04 703 15.05 1264 -6.34 1247 -85.03 
p(high debt>low debt) <0.001 <0.001 1.000 
p(high debt<low debt) 1.000 1.000 <0.001 
Shadow price of 
working capital (%) 
1692 -45.09 1673 -17.29 723 -49.26 703 -41.42 1264 -22.92 1247 -17.45 
p(high debt>low debt) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
p(high debt<low debt) >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Notes: LU=livestock units. P-values based on two-sample t-test for paired data. 
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Table A8. Germany (East): Production elasticities based on production function estimates (Cobb Douglas fixed effects) 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
Labour 0.17# 0.12 0.04# 0.04# 0.08# 0.01# 
Land 0.41 0.23 0.17 -0.06 0.10# 0.19 
Working capital 0.41 0.64 0.35 0.41 0.58 0.62 
Fixed capital 0.04# 0.05# 0.07# 0.17 0.15 0.02# 
Cows -- -- 0.47 0.34 <0.01# 0.01 
No. of observations 1692 1673 723 703 1264 1247 
No. of farms 402 382 185 183 335 343 
Notes: All estimates based on group-demeaned variables (fixed effects regression). Year dummies are included but results not shown. All coefficients are significant at 
least at the 5% level except when marked with #, based on standard errors robust to clustering in groups. 
 
Table A9. Determinants of shadow prices (pooled OLS) 
 Fixed capital Working capital 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Debt-to-asset ratio 10.92*** 0.70 107.97*** 3.88 -56.05*** 2.78 22.58*** 1.92 6.37*** 1.33 10.33*** 1.53 
Owned land (ha) 0.03*** <0.01 0.06* 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.05*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 
Corporate farm 
(1/0) 
-10.35*** 1.23 1.69 2.98 34.65** 17.24 -6.60*** 2.00 -0.78 3.03 -11.48*** 3.41 
Age of manager -0.55** 0.23 -0.02 1.01 -0.56 0.74 0.19 0.42 0.93*** 0.34 -0.74 0.51 
Age square 0.01** <0.01 >-0.01 0.01 <0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 -0.01** <0.01 0.01 <0.01 
R² 0.191 0.444 0.310 0.199 0.068 0.071 
No. of observations 2399 1120 1292 2399 1120 1292 
*** (**, *) significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
Notes: Year dummies and constant are included but results not shown. Outliers in dependent variable eliminated prior to estimation. 
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Germany (West) 
Figure A7. Shadow prices of fixed capital 
 
 
Figure A8. Shadow prices of working capital 
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Table A10. Germany (West): Descriptive statistics and mean comparison of shadow prices 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Output (ths €) 3968 118.69 4355 183.26 5568 100.97 5674 168.13 4917 130.25 5249 195.41 
Labour (ths hours) 3968 3.75 4355 4.88 5568 3.47 5674 4.16 4917 3.43 5249 4.11 
Land (ha) 3968 75.27 4355 101.43 5568 45.68 5674 73.37 4917 57.13 5249 78.74 
Working capital (ths €) 3968 75.15 4355 119.94 5568 62.80 5674 107.98 4917 97.44 5249 149.33 
Fixed capital (ths €) 3968 20.42 4355 28.71 5568 18.53 5674 26.48 4917 20.56 5249 28.12 
Cows (LU) 3968 0.50 4355 1.34 5568 36.94 5674 60.19 4917 10.56 5249 13.24 
Debt-to-asset ratio 3968 0.03 4355 0.32 5568 0.05 5674 0.29 4917 0.04 5249 0.32 
Owned land (ha) 3968 34.53 4355 25.13 5568 22.56 5674 22.25 4917 25.86 5249 22.98 
Corporate farm (1/0) 3968 0.00 4355 0.00 5568 0.00 5674 0.00 4917 0.00 5249 0.00 
Age of manager (years) 3860 54.20 4208 56.56 5514 55.36 5598 58.76 4858 55.44 5172 57.97 
Shadow price of fixed 
capital (%) 
3968 -49.76 4355 -39.40 5568 -82.20 5674 -54.42 4917 -32.54 5249 -33.17 
p(high debt>low debt) <0.001 <0.001 0.828 
p(high debt<low debt) >0.999 >0.999 0.172 
Shadow price of 
working capital (%) 
3968 -26.44 4355 -15.07 5568 -36.04 5674 -26.97 4917 -16.34 5249 3.76 
p(high debt>low debt) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
p(high debt<low debt) >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Notes: LU=livestock units. P-values based on two-sample t-test for paired data. 
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Table A11. Germany (West): Production elasticities based on production function estimates (Cobb Douglas fixed effects) 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
Labour 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.02# 0.04# 
Land 0.25 0.23 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.11 
Working capital 0.47 0.56 0.39 0.46 0.63 0.80 
Fixed capital 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.08 
Cows -- -- 0.33 0.26 0.02 0.01 
No. of observations 3942 4381 5471 5771 4863 5303 
No. of farms 933 1099 1005 1081 1295 1447 
Notes: All estimates based on group-demeaned variables (fixed effects regression). Year dummies are included but results not shown. All coefficients are significant at 
least at the 5% level except when marked with #, based on standard errors robust to clustering in groups. 
 
Table A12. Determinants of shadow prices (pooled OLS) 
 Fixed capital Working capital 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Debt-to-asset ratio 16.53*** 1.69 57.87*** 4.02 11.48*** 1.41 2.23* 1.16 9.05*** 1.22 18.17*** 2.01 
Owned land (ha) < 0.01 0.01 0.13*** 0.01 0.05** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.01* 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 
Corporate farm 
(1/0) 
--  --  --  --  --  --  
Age of manager -0.57** 0.28 -0.63*** 0.18 -0.66** 0.31 -0.20 0.27 -0.08 0.14 0.64*** 0.21 
Age square < 0.01 < 0.01 0.01*** < 0.01 < 0.01** < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01* < 0.01 < 0.01** < 
0.01 
R² 0.049 0.240 0.027 0.019 0.047 0.080 
No. of observations 8086 11112 10032 8086 11112 10032 
*** (**, *) significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
Notes: Year dummies and constant are included but results not shown. Outliers in dependent variable eliminated prior to estimation. 
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Italy 
Figure A9. Shadow prices of fixed capital 
 
 
Figure A10. Shadow prices of working capital 
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Table A13. Italy: Descriptive statistics and mean comparison of shadow prices 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Output (ths €) 29135 55.93 1261 125.06 6700 152.42 1139 216.41 6176 83.91 411 168.39 
Labour (ths hours) 29135 3.52 1261 5.97 6700 5.28 1139 6.56 6176 4.21 411 6.81 
Land (ha) 29135 38.93 1261 65.21 6700 37.50 1139 50.05 6176 38.98 411 75.46 
Working capital (ths €) 29135 26.91 1261 60.04 6700 84.29 1139 128.06 6176 44.94 411 92.62 
Fixed capital (ths €) 29135 10.10 1261 22.18 6700 17.79 1139 27.20 6176 11.73 411 22.11 
Cows (LU) -- -- ‐‐  ‐‐  6700 47.38 1139 63.55 6176 9.09 411 18.70 
Debt-to-asset ratio 29135 0.00 1261 0.18 6700 0.00 1139 0.14 6176 0.00 411 0.14 
Owned land (ha) 29135 24.63 1261  33.18  6700 13.43 1139 14.42 6176 21.80 411 24.41 
Corporate farm (1/0) 29135 0.07 1261  0.10  6700 0.05 1139 0.07 6176 0.05 411 0.06 
Age of manager (years) 28822 50.85 1245  58.56  6674 54.63 1132 58.28 6128 53.70 409 58.76 
Shadow price of fixed 
capital (%) 
29135 -17.95 1261 -70.75 6700 -33.65 1139 -57.13 6176 -12.58 411 22.83 
p(high debt>low debt) >0.999 >0.999 <0.001 
p(high debt<low debt) <0.001 <0.001 >0.999 
Shadow price of 
working capital (%) 
29135 24.87 1261 6.57 6700 -37.49 1139 -54.61 6176 0.09 411 -28.32 
p(high debt>low debt) >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
p(high debt<low debt) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Notes: LU=livestock units. P-values based on two-sample t-test for paired data. 
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Table A14. Italy: Production elasticities based on production function estimates (Cobb Douglas fixed effects) 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
Labour 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.05# 0.08 -0.01# 
Land 0.23 0.19 0.06 0.07# 0.19 0.41 
Working capital 0.50 0.46 0.30 0.25 0.46 0.34 
Fixed capital 0.14 0.05# 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.17 
Cows -- -- 0.30 0.49 0.02 -0.03# 
No. of observations 29135 1261 6700 1139 6176 411 
No. of farms 10157 436 2682 425 2981 181 
Notes: All estimates based on group-demeaned variables (fixed effects regression). Year dummies are included but results not shown. All coefficients are significant at 
least at the 5% level except when marked with #, based on standard errors robust to clustering in groups. 
 
Table A15. Determinants of shadow prices (pooled OLS) 
 Fixed capital Working capital 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Debt-to-asset ratio -80.07*** 20.97 -81.24*** 5.77 139.51*** 19.34 -27.25*** 7.86 -62.93*** 4.30 -93.86*** 10.59 
Owned land (ha) 0.03*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.02 0.09*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 
Corporate farm 
(1/0) 
27.40*** 1.71 14.57*** 2.10 32.58*** 4.37 8.82*** 2.36 2.21 1.40 12.37*** 3.58 
Age of manager 0.30*** 0.03 -0.11 0.21 -0.59 0.37 0.08** 0.04 -0.43*** 0.16 0.18 0.25 
Age square >-0.01*** <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.01** <0.01 >-0.01*** <0.01 <0.01*** <0.01 >-0.01 <0.01 
R² 0.038 0.063 0.051 0.018 0.071 0.039 
No. of observations 30068 7808 6540 30068 7808 6540 
*** (**, *) significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors  
Notes: Year dummies and constant are included but results not shown. Outliers in dependent variable eliminated prior to estimation. 
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Poland 
Figure A11. Shadow prices of fixed capital  
 
 
Figure A12. Shadow prices of working capital 
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Table A16. Poland: Descriptive statistics and mean comparison of shadow prices 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Output (ths €) 8802 28.28 4287 84.80 3929 27.42 2198 50.80 15042 20.97 6606 54.92 
Labour (ths hours) 8802 4.41 4287 6.34 3929 4.15 2198 4.72 15042 3.86 6606 5.03 
Land (ha) 8802 34.06 4287 113.39 3929 21.50 2198 36.06 15042 20.23 6606 49.46 
Working capital (ths €) 8802 16.83 4287 56.68 3929 14.96 2198 27.93 15042 13.85 6606 37.43 
Fixed capital (ths €) 8802 5.12 4287 12.29 3929 4.18 2198 7.05 15042 3.49 6606 7.26 
Cows (LU) 8802 0.96 4287 1.67 3929 16.52 2198 27.58 15042 4.12 6606 7.99 
Debt-to-asset ratio 8802 0.03 4287 0.27 3929 0.03 2198 0.21 15042 0.02 6606 0.17 
Owned land (ha) 8802 22.04 4287 53.64 3929 16.32 2198 23.84 15042 15.34 6606 30.63 
Corporate farm (1/0) 8802 0.00 4287 0.04 3929 0.00 2198 0.00 15042 0.00 6606 0.01 
Age of manager (years) 8721 62.30 4119 65.92 3909 63.26 2185 66.53 14937 62.39 6531 65.87 
Shadow price of fixed 
capital (%) 
8802 -67.77 4287 -53.24 3929 -107.47 2198 -73.00 15042 -78.03 6606 -65.61 
p(high debt>low debt) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
p(high debt<low debt) 1.000 >0.999 >0.999 
Shadow price of 
working capital (%) 
8802 -26.19 4287 -27.12 3929 -59.45 2198 -55.75 15042 -26.86 6606 -29.55 
p(high debt>low debt) 0.942 <0.001 >0.999 
p(high debt<low debt) 0.057 >0.999 <0.001 
Notes: LU=livestock units. P-values based on two-sample t-test for paired data. 
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Table A17. Poland: Production elasticities based on production function estimates (Cobb Douglas fixed effects) 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
Labour 0.17 0.11 0.01# 0.05# 0.08 0.07 
Land 0.28 0.35 0.13 0.13 0.26 0.26 
Working capital 0.41 0.41 0.22 0.23 0.47 0.44 
Fixed capital 0.06 0.06 -0.01# 0.03# 0.03 0.04 
Cows -- -- 0.45 0.52 0.01 0.01 
No. of observations 8802 4287 3929 2198 15042 6606 
No. of farms 3129 1357 1478 840 4976 2218 
Notes: All estimates based on group-demeaned variables (fixed effects regression). Year dummies are included but results not shown. All coefficients are significant at 
least at the 5% level except when marked with #, based on standard errors robust to clustering in groups. 
 
Table A18. Determinants of shadow prices (pooled OLS) 
 Fixed capital Working capital 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Debt-to-asset ratio 30.64*** 1.73 97.24*** 2.23 40.35*** 1.27 -4.49** 1.85 11.93*** 1.42 -5.87*** 1.45 
Owned land (ha) 0.07*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 
Corporate farm 
(1/0) 
-48.34*** 4.28 -- -- -71.30*** 2.46 -6.35 14.29 -- -- 0.53 2.16 
Age of manager 0.82*** 0.22 0.12 0.18 0.31*** 0.10 1.20*** 0.36 0.75*** 0.17 0.34 0.26 
Age square -0.01*** <0.01 0.00 0.00 >-0.01*** <0.01 -0.01*** <0.01 -0.01*** <0.01 >-0.01 <0.01 
R² 0.113 0.473 0.161 0.017 0.061 0.066 
No. of observations 12840 6094 21470 12840 6094 21470 
*** (**, *) significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  
Notes: Year dummies and constant are included but results not shown. Outliers in dependent variable eliminated prior to estimation. 
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Slovakia 
Figure A13. Shadow prices of fixed capital 
 
 
Figure A14. Shadow prices of working capital 
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Table A19. Slovakia: Descriptive statistics and mean comparison of shadow prices 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Output (ths €) 544 693.41 309 476.81 102 878.04 100 779.23 241 1443.35 248 1225.84 
Labour (ths hours) 544 50.39 309 29.18 102 100.16 100 76.75 241 128.16 248 103.34 
Land (ha) 544 808.62 309 695.42 102 1386.26 100 1192.32 241 1578.63 248 1533.82 
Working capital (ths €) 544 493.03 309 365.34 102 684.23 100 581.84 241 1057.92 248 953.91 
Fixed capital (ths €) 544 151.01 309 85.21 102 399.37 100 273.89 241 385.61 248 316.82 
Cows (LU)     102 294.77 100 248.26 241 258.46 248 227.30 
Debt-to-asset ratio 544 0.04 309 0.27 102 0.04 100 0.19 241 0.02 248 0.15 
Owned land (ha) 544 33.00 309 32.93 102 17.43 100 17.33 241 29.96 248 64.40 
Corporate farm (1/0) 544 0.47 309 0.23 102 0.95 100 0.84 241 0.88 248 0.88 
Age of manager (years) 289 55.13 238 58.24 6 57.50 16 57.25 28 55.11 31 55.61 
Shadow price of fixed 
capital (%) 
544 -21.97 309 -77.49 102 -132.72 100 -69.94 241 -73.07 248 -91.64 
p(high debt>low debt) >0.999 <0.001 >0.999 
p(high debt<low debt) <0.001 >0.999 <0.001 
Shadow price of 
working capital (%) 
544 -11.99 309 -45.85 102 -50.05 100 -75.40 241 -21.32 248 -36.14 
p(high debt>low debt) >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
p(high debt<low debt) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Notes: LU=livestock units. P-values based on two-sample t-test for paired data. 
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Table A20. Slovakia: Production elasticities based on production function estimates (Cobb Douglas fixed effects) 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
Labour 0.08# 0.19 0.16# -0.14# 0.21# 0.16# 
Land 0.08# 0.35 0.16# -0.53# -0.12# 0.20# 
Working capital 0.66 0.41 0.38 0.20# 0.60 0.51 
Fixed capital 0.10 0.03# -0.08# 0.05# 0.05# 0.01# 
Cows -- -- -0.20# 0.89 <0.01# -0.01# 
No. of observations 544 309 102 100 241 248 
No. of farms 194 98 41 39 103 104 
Notes: All estimates based on group-demeaned variables (fixed effects regression). Year dummies are included but results not shown. All coefficients are significant at 
least at the 5% level except when marked with #, based on standard errors robust to clustering in groups. 
 
Table A21. Determinants of shadow prices (pooled OLS) 
 Fixed capital Working capital 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Debt-to-asset ratio -102.65*** 10.11 117.76*** 14.74 -40.51*** 6.23 -60.32*** 5.14 -34.74*** 6.78 -28.63*** 10.12 
Owned land (ha) -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 >-0.01*** 0.00 0.01** 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Corporate farm 
(1/0) 
-9.53*** 3.52 -8.05 12.58 -14.48*** 4.08 5.39** 2.12 4.61 4.77 13.94*** 3.55 
Age of manager -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Age square -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
R² 0.129 0.241 0.153 0.167 0.142 0.118 
No. of observations 853 202 489 853 202 489 
*** (**, *) significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
Notes: Year dummies and constant are included but results not shown. Outliers in dependent variable eliminated prior to estimation. 
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United Kingdom 
Figure A15. Shadow prices of fixed capital 
 
 
Figure A16. Shadow prices of working capital 
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Table A22. United Kingdom: Descriptive statistics and mean comparison of shadow prices 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Output (ths €) 2185 219.86 2289 297.22 2096 202.15 1838 301.93 937 170.26 902 246.81 
Labour (ths hours) 2185 5.38 2289 7.05 2096 5.69 1838 6.72 937 5.55 902 6.43 
Land (ha) 2185 206.75 2289 251.20 2096 87.45 1838 114.96 937 154.65 902 200.70 
Working capital (ths €) 2185 147.80 2289 208.18 2096 130.10 1838 206.70 937 129.41 902 199.83 
Fixed capital (ths €) 2185 36.98 2289 48.05 2096 24.81 1838 32.52 937 26.39 902 33.01 
Cows (LU) 2185 0.81 2289 0.90 2096 88.93 1838 129.12 937 13.17 902 28.37 
Debt-to-asset ratio 2185 0.03 2288 0.26 2096 0.03 1838 0.28 937 0.03 902 0.26 
Owned land (ha) 2185 159.37 2289 117.28 2096 63.94 1838 67.46 937 97.75 902 97.16 
Corporate farm (1/0) 2185 0.08 2289 0.09 2096 0.01 1838 0.02 937 0.04 902 0.04 
Age of manager (years) 2185 242.79 2289 227.97 2096 167.99 1838 213.24 937 154.77 902 209.39 
Shadow price of fixed 
capital (%) 
2185 -54.84 2289 -30.63 2096 -91.10 1838 -57.88 937 -28.24 902 14.97 
p(high debt>low debt) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
p(high debt<low debt) >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Shadow price of 
working capital (%) 
2185 -6.66 2289 -15.73 2096 -28.33 1838 -24.56 937 -14.38 902 -32.45 
p(high debt>low debt) >0.999 <0.001 >0.999 
p(high debt<low debt) <0.001 >0.999 <0.001 
Notes: LU=livestock units. P-values based on two-sample t-test for paired data. 
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Table A23. United Kingdom: Production elasticities based on production function estimates (Cobb Douglas fixed effects) 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Low debt High debt Low debt High debt Low debt High debt 
Labour 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.24 0.10# 
Land 0.27 0.18 0.06# 0.07 0.02# 0.33 
Working capital 0.67 0.61 0.47 0.51 0.67 0.57 
Fixed capital 0.07 0.10 0.01# 0.04 0.10 0.14 
Cows -- -- 0.48 0.39 0.03# 0.01# 
No. of observations 2185 2289 2096 1838 937 902 
No. of farms 559 615 482 466 305 309 
Notes: All estimates based on group-demeaned variables (fixed effects regression). Year dummies are included but results not shown. All coefficients are significant at 
least at the 5% level except when marked with #, based on standard errors robust to clustering in groups. 
 
Table A24. Determinants of shadow prices (pooled OLS) 
 Fixed capital Working capital 
 Field crops Dairy Mixed Field crops Dairy Mixed 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Debt-to-asset ratio 44.62*** 2.98 66.76*** 2.61 91.66*** 11.56 -14.86*** 1.77 0.29 1.40 -33.55*** 3.13 
Owned land (ha) -0.02*** <0.01 <0.01 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.00 0.01* <0.01 >-0.01 <0.01 
Corporate farm 
(1/0) 
9.74*** 1.99 0.23 2.21 16.65** 7.06 1.43 1.59 2.30 1.47 4.69 2.90 
Age of manager -0.11* 0.05 0.11*** 0.02 0.23* 0.12 0.22*** 0.04 0.07*** 0.02 0.05 0.06 
Age square <0.01** 0.00 >-0.01*** <0.01 >-0.01* <0.01 >-0.01*** <0.01 >-
0.01*** 
<0.01 >-0.01 <0.01 
R² 0.119 0.371 0.118 0.136 0.024 0.078 
No. of observations 4473 3934 1839 4473 3934 1839 
*** (**, *) significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
Notes: Year dummies and constant are included but results not shown. Outliers in dependent variable eliminated prior to estimation. 
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